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Abstract. A security ceremony expands a security protocol with every-
thing that is considered out of band for it. Notably, it incorporates the
user, who, according to their belief systems and cultural values, may be
variously targeted by social engineering attacks. This makes ceremonies
complex and varied, hence the need for their formal analysis aimed at
their rigorous understanding.
Formal analysis in turn requires clarifying the ceremony structure to
build a ceremony model. The model defined here spans over a number
of socio-technical layers, ranging from a computer network to society. It
inspires a layered analysis of security ceremonies, that is layer by layer.
This paper focuses on the human-computer interaction layer, which fea-
tures a socio-technical protocol between a user persona and a computer
interface. Future work will be to traverse all layers by formal analysis.
1 Introduction
The awareness that computer security is much more than a technical issue con-
solidated through the last decade. Today, it can be claimed that accomplishing
the security goal in practice requires heterogeneous and combined efforts at least
from computer scientists, social scientists, experimental psychologists, cognitive
scientists, and web and HCI designers. Most recent flaws are not due to techni-
cal deficiencies but to social engineering techniques to fool the human user into
making mistakes [1]. This growing awareness inspired the concept of ceremony
a few years back, introduced by Walker and elaborated further by Ellison [2],
which expands a security protocol to include whatever was left out-of band. In
particular, a ceremony recognises the role played by the human, who is “likely
to do incomplete comparisons of values, for example” [2]. Capturing this in-
complete and partial behaviour is essential for ceremony analysis that reflects
real-world interactions and behaviours. Socio-technical modelling in security [3]
typically models actions on information objects. Whilst this is valuable, it does
not account for the different patterns of practice that are influenced by social
and personal factors. In recognising patterns of practice, we capture a range of
incomplete comparisons of value that better reflect real-world behaviours.
Motivation. Many insights derive from putting a protocol in a context [4,5],
which may involve a number of technical and social elements. A simple but
representative note is that protocols involving public-key cryptography cannot be
used safely in contexts where certification authorities cannot be access reliably.
Also, the protocol users cannot be assumed to always act as anticipated by
the protocol designers. These notes demonstrate the context sensitive nature
of technology. They also indicate that it is more than context at work: the
circumstances of technology use, the cultural values, the belief systems and the
demographic factors, simplified below as the user’s persona, play a substantial
role in shaping user responses.
Cooper acknowledged human personas in the design process [6,7] but, to our
knowledge, a framework that incorporates personas in the formal analysis of
security ceremonies is not yet available — though strongly desirable. We shall
see that our personas are more fine-grained than Cooper’s as each user can
express a variety of them in front of the same technology at different times. We
recall that formal analysis means specification and verification whose syntax and
semantics are mathematically founded. Traditional formal analysis of security
protocols evaluates them against given security goals. This paper argues that,
due to the complex nature of persona interaction with information protocols, it
is valuable to graphically map out the interactions in order to visualise them
prior to analysing them formally.
The complexity of ceremonies is acknowledged by many. Radke et al. ob-
serve that “a different context, even for the same set of protocols, is a different
ceremony” [8]. We shall see that such a context may in turn entail various per-
sonas. For example, while approaching online banking, a user may express a
very cautious persona at first, and a more relaxed one after reassurance from
their friends. Karlof et al. appear to deduce that security can be established by
constraining the user interaction with a number of forcing functions [9] such
as the impossibility to continue unless a box is ticked. However, this may not
always be viable, for example because there are many perspectives on privacy,
and individuals construct notions of privacy in individual ways [10]. Therefore, a
population of Internet service users will engage with a service provider’s privacy
policy in many ways, as privacy fieldstudies show [7,11]. In consequence, the
challenge to develop methodologies for the analysis of general ceremonies where
humans interact in non-deterministic ways is significant.
Contribution. In facing such a complexity, the first step of our research was
to map the full structure of a security ceremony. The map can be viewed as
a model that turns out to feature multiple layers, spanning from a computer
network through the human and over to society. Depending on the analyst’s
focus, certain layers of the model can be conveniently collapsed and assumed to
function. Layers can then be analysed in isolation, and future work is to tackle
them in combination. Incidentally, “security” is used loosely here to refer to
any security property, such as certification, confidentiality and also privacy. A
ceremony will be termed accordingly to its main security goal, for example as a
certification ceremony, a confidentiality ceremony or a privacy ceremony.
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Our model enables a layered view of security ceremonies, and allows for for-
mal analysis of ceremonies from different perspectives. The present paper con-
centrates on the human-computer interaction layer, III in the model. This layer
features a protocol between a user persona and a computer interface, hence a
socio-technical protocol. The analysis proceeds from the development of a graph-
ical representation of a socio-technical protocol, which in turn demands an im-
plicit encoding of human personas. As a result, our representation can show the
various paths of execution of a protocol, each path implicitly encoding a specific
persona. This is demonstrated over the socio-technical protocol of an example se-
curity ceremony whereby an Internet user registers with a service provider. This
ceremony, which is widespread at present as many services require registration,
sees the user enter some personal information, hence it is a privacy ceremony as
the main security goal is the user’s privacy.
It must be remarked that our ceremony model does not intend to prescribe
a specific formal method. By contrast, it aims at providing a common canvas on
which to use the methods that seem most appropriate. The method we choose for
the human-computer interaction layer rests on mathematical induction for the
sake of specification, and in inspired by security protocol analysis [12]. Properties
of interest can then be assessed through the corresponding induction principle.
Known strengths are the support offered by a tool running on a computer, a
theorem prover, and the capacity to reason about systems of unbounded size.
Paper summary. A general model of security ceremony is defined (§2), and
an example ceremony is outlined (§3). A graphical representation of a ceremony
layer is proposed and demonstrated on an example ceremony (§4). Our method
of formal analysis of ceremonies is described and demonstrated on that layer of
the example ceremony (§5). Conclusions outline on-going and future work (§6).
2 A Security Ceremony Model
As mentioned above, a security ceremony expands a security protocol with the
out-of-band, notably with the user [2]. However, a number of layers must be
traversed for a security property that the protocol enforces to reach the human.
This observation inspires the multiple-layer model of security ceremony pictured
in Figure 1, which provides the basis of our formal analysis.
It can be seen that several layers are identified, going beyond the ceremonies
between users and systems as described by Ellison. Our model is capable of cap-
turing additional interaction layers between users and technology. This aim is
also supported by Whitworth, who advances the importance of the interfaces
between humans and machines, and acknowledges the outermost layer whereby
society influences by any means, such as word of mouth and publicity, the hu-
mans’ engagement with technology [13]. Therefore, we are oriented to see the
workbench for a socio-technical security analysis as a finer-grained picture.
The layers in Figure 1 feature various abstractions of two example users Alice
and Bob, additionally expanded with Society — such abstractions will be termed
players. The (yellow) small boxes indicate the players. From right to left, they
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Fig. 1. The security ceremony model underlying our formal analysis
respectively are the computer process pB running a security protocol with Alice
on Bob’s behalf and the computer process pA running the security protocol with
Bob on Alice’s behalf. Then come the graphical user interface UIA for her, a
generic persona PA of hers, and finally Alice as a human, that is, her self SA.
The layers can be understood as follows.
Layer I. Informational concerns the security protocol running between com-
puter processes in order to secure Alice and Bob’s communications over a
potentially insecure network.
Layer II. Operating System manages the inter-process communication be-
tween the process that executes the security protocol on behalf of a user and
the process that runs the graphical interface presented to that user.
Layer III. Human-Computer Interaction indicates the socio-technical pro-
tocol whereby a user interacts with a graphical interface, typically by filling
forms in. This is clearly a technical protocol because of the interaction with
technology, but is deeply intertwined with the social protocols regulating the
individuals’ expressions of social capabilities such as trust, recommendations
and advice [14]. Precisely, the user is not involved directly but through one
of their personas, expressed through the outermore layer.
Layer IV. Personal pertains to the user expression of a persona to engage
with specific technology. According to Cooper [6], a persona is a realistic
description of a user of the design, with their specific attitudes and goals.
We take a yet finer-grained definition, upon the basis that a user may express
various personas, as we shall see (§4). For example, arguably when accessing
on-line bank services to pay for bills, users express different personas than
when accessing their Facebook accounts to catch up with friends. Or they
can be more unwilling to download new applications when in the middle of
bank transactions than when attempting to share contents with friends.
Layer V. Communal reflects the reciprocal influence of society over individ-
uals. For example, a national campaign could influence users towards being
more careful in opening attachments from unknown sources.
Adjacent layers share a player, who plays in both layers. Each layer features
what is termed an interaction between a pair of players, such as the socio-
technical protocol or the security protocol. The (blue) rectangles indicate the
interactions. Players only interact within a layer. Interacting players may not
belong to the same user, as is the case of layer I. An early version of this model,
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which is also inspired by Whitworth’s socio-technical research [13], was already
published [15]. The version presented in this paper fixes players and interaction
of layer III thanks to the work presented below. Most importantly, it also points
out a new interpretation of the model, where layers can be conveniently collapsed
as a concertina.
3 Example Ceremony Outline
Privacy ceremonies are particular security ceremonies whose main goal is pri-
vacy. Typically, they are studied through fieldwork that relies on surveys as a
traditional means of measuring privacy attitudes.
An example of privacy ceremony sees an Internet user register with a service
provider. Two surveys indicated a range of privacy practices and attitudes when
humans engage with on-line services [16,17]. The surveys confirmed the paradox
traditionally found in privacy literature [18,19,20] that users want autonomy over
on-line privacy but are prepared to trade their privacy in return for some reward.
The VOME project [21] took a multi-method research approach to observe and
denote the personas of the engaging users [22,23]. In noting that service users
have varying senses about how their private information will be treated by the
service provider, the fieldwork identified two main personas. One is goal-driven
and accepts the provider’s conditions in order to obtain its service. Another
common one queries the provider and takes various actions to either obtain
more information about the provider’s privacy policy or to disengage from the
registration process. Each of these personas need to be modelled in such a way
that their particular security implications can be analysed.
For example, the current registration page with Amazon implements a very
basic privacy ceremony: after the user information is entered, an account can
be created with just one click. It is clear that simplicity is boosted with the
aim of enhancing usability and therefore engagement. However, arguably those
users expressing the second persona outlined above, who seek explanations and
reassurances about their privacy, feel that their privacy is not being adequately
treated by the present ceremony, and hence are unlikely to engage. The following
sections describe our formal approach to capturing these complex interactions.
4 Representing Layer III of Security Ceremonies
Layer III, termed human-computer interaction, sees a socio-technical protocol
between a persona and an interface. We develop a graphical representation of this
layer taking advantage of an encoding of personas. While this is useful for the
formal analysis that will follow (§5), it is valuable on its own as it may be yet more
widely understandable than a formal specification. The graphical representation
provides a means of extending the informal descriptions of privacy ceremonies.
We give an example below based on multi-persona registration using various
specified notions, highlighted in italics. Working with security senses enables the
5
map of persona interaction to be more expressive, enabling the formal analysis
to be more nuanced in articulating different persona interactions.
With security ceremonies in general, personas may have various security
senses. A security sense is a feeling that contributes to an emotional or atti-
tudinal position at a given time on the security goals that the ceremony aims at
achieving. Therefore, we shall be allowed to talk about confidentiality senses,
or authentication senses or privacy senses, depending on the type of ceremony
being analysed. Four basic meaningful senses, which could of course be refined
and specialised, can be described:
caution is the main sense that personas have at the beginning of their interac-
tion with an interface. This sense is often engendered by the public discussion
of security concerns.
puzzlement exemplifies the perception that something may be going wrong or
out of the user control. The fieldwork indicates that it may also characterise
personas expressed (through layer IV) by experienced users.
confidence is the positive sense that the interaction with the (interface of
the) service is going satisfactorily. A common requirement is that confidence
should always accompany the completion of a session.
unconfidence is the negative sense that the interaction with the service is
not going satisfactorily. A common requirement is that unconfidence should
never arise, especially out of session completion.
From examples of persona interaction with the ceremony, we can abstract
that security senses may arise in combination, namely in security stances. A
stance is a set of senses, that is an emotional or attitudinal position at a given
time on the security goals that the ceremony aims at achieving. The number
of potential stances on four senses is sixteen, which is the cardinality of the
powerset of the set of senses. For our treatment, it is useful to number the
potential stances, for example as in Figure 2. The fieldwork confirms that some
stances are practically rare, such as the empty stance, St0, or contradictory,
such as those stances featuring both confidence and unconfidence, St10, St13
and St15. Other stances are rather implausible, such as those featuring both
puzzlement and confidence, St8 and St12 (and obviously St15).
After security senses and stances, the possible action names, also termed
cues, used in the ceremony to analyse must be defined. It must be remarked that
whenever user and provider are mentioned in the following, they act respectively
through their persona and interface. Our example ceremony rests on these cues:
Begins indicates a persona’s wish to initiate a session with a service provider,
such as typing in its URL to obtain the main interface.
Registers expresses a persona’s successful completion of a session.
Aborts expresses a persona’s unsuccessful completion of a transaction.
Compels indicates the interface use of forcing functions whereby a user is forced
to do some action in order to proceed with the interaction. For example, the
provider’s privacy policy must be accepted by a tick to continue.
Queries represents a request of additional clarification or information in gen-
eral, which both persona and interface may make through specific clicks.
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St0 = {}
St1 = {caution}
St2 = {puzzlement}
St3 = {confidence}
St4 = {unconfidence}
St5 = {caution, puzzlement}
St6 = {caution, confidence}
St7 = {caution, unconfidence}
St8 = {puzzlement, confidence}
St9 = {puzzlement, unconfidence}
St10 = {confidence, unconfidence}
St11 = {caution, puzzlement, confidence}
St12 = {puzzlement, confidence, unconfidence}
St13 = {confidence, unconfidence, caution}
St14 = {unconfidence, caution, puzzlement}
St15 = {caution, puzzlement, confidence, unconfidence}
Fig. 2. The potential security stances
Explains indicates the release of additional information that both persona and
interface may do, such as the provider’s (uncommon though desirable) prac-
tice of providing additional information about their privacy policy, which
could ultimately be negotiated with the user.
An action is an occurrence of a cue between two players, such as “P Begins
I” to indicate a persona P who begins interacting with an interface I. Actions
and their implications on security senses were explored in the qualitative re-
search [23], highlighting that actions influence the security senses of a persona.
In particular, each stance depends on the previous stance and on the action just
taken. Therefore, it is convenient to define an episode as the pair consisting of
an action and the stance it leads to. Upon this basis, a socio-technical protocol
can be defined as a list of episodes, hence its players are identified and also the
sequence of stances that the user takes throughout. Therefore, a persona is the
sequence of stances taken during a socio-technical protocol, which form an ex-
pression of the user’s while the user interacts. The advantage of this approach is
that we are able to move beyond simple action-object socio-technical expression
and introduce the notion of patterns of practice influenced by different personal
and social factors (represented here as sequences of stances).
The dynamics of layer III of the ceremony to analyse can be now represented
as a graph, accounting for a number of personas. Our example ceremony is
built on the actual fieldwork [23,22]. It maps typical responses to the request to
disclose personal data. Layer III of the resulting ceremony, featuring all stances
except the contradictory or implausible ones, can be represented as a graph,
precisely a tree, which is in Figure 3. Reading the stances on each path describes
a persona, while reading the episodes describes a socio-technical protocol.
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Fig. 3. Graphical representation of layer III of the example ceremony: each path en-
codes a specific persona interacting with a user interface, i.e. a socio-technical protocol
In particular, path St0, St1, St2, St7 is the persona that aborts with a stance
of caution with unconfidence because compelled by a forcing function; path St0,
St1, St2, St5 is the persona that gets a stance of caution with puzzlement fol-
lowing registration. The path departing from stance St1, a sense of caution,
and leading to registration with stance St3, a sense of confidence, indicates the
persona facing an interface where the provider explains their privacy policy ad-
equately and then exits. Another path departing from stance St2, a sense of
puzzlement, represents a persona who wants to understand how their privacy is
going to be managed, and therefore poses queries. The path branches towards
abortion when the provider refuses to provide adequate explanation, or towards
registration when the provider accepts to dialogue with the persona on privacy.
Figure 3 communicates several aspects of the ceremony layer. With the men-
tality of traditional security protocol analysis, it can be understood as a protocol
with branches. From the standpoint of socio-technical analysis, it is the complete
layer III: each of its paths encodes specific persona and interface, and also the
socio-technical protocol between them. Our representation also appears to be
flexible. For example, the sequence of actions in a path could be repeated in a
parallel path featuring difference stances to account for different personas taking
the same actions.
The outcome of formal analysis can then be used to motivate refinements of
the underlying social theory as well as modifications to the technical protocols to
better support the required stances. Also, it must be remarked that our ceremony
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representation does not aim at a descriptive model of human behaviour, as is
often found in statistical analysis. Rather, human behaviour is represented as
personas, in turn encoded as combinations of actions and stances.
5 Analysing Layer III of Security Ceremonies Formally
This Section explores the type of analysis that may be performed once the Layer
III interactions are mapped. The formal analysis of layer III of security cer-
emonies is challenging because of the variety of socio-technical protocols and
personas to account for. In order to include Layer III within formal security anal-
ysis, the ceremonies first need to be mapped so that systematic analysis can take
place. Our formal analysis at this layer aims at providing a mathematically-solid
ground to the analysis of ceremonies. This will help ceremony designers predict
the potential effects of the various combinations of stances and actions, and to
suggest possible refinements of such combinations in step with a refinement of
the underlying social theory. In other words, the formal analysis can be used in
many ways, such as to foresee what protocol may lead to a desired stance or,
vice versa, to evaluate the stances of a protocol.
A variety of formal approaches can be taken, such as model checking [24]
and theorem proving [25]. Here, we opt for the latter because we aim at deriving
formal statements, supported by mathematical proof, about the security stances
of the players interacting at layer III. Another reason is to answer queries of the
form: if a user registers with a provider without getting any explanation, will he
feel confident? The theorem prover we use is Isabelle [25], taking inspiration from
vast work conducted to analyse security protocols [12]. The main specification
strategy that is adopted is mathematical induction, which allows for the compact
specification of systems of unbounded size, such as the natural numbers. The
main reasoning strategy is the corresponding induction principle. A brief outline
of Isabelle is in Appendix A.
5.1 Formal Specification of the Example Ceremony
This Section takes the graphical representation of a ceremony seen above (§4)
and reformulates it using a formal language (whose syntax and semantics are
mathematically defined).
A type for players and a datatype of cues are defined:
types player = nat
datatype cue = Begins | Queries | Registers | Aborts
| Compels | Explains
Actions are defined as the cartesian product between players, cues and play-
ers. An action is thus formalised as a triple, making it possible to denote, for
example, actions involving a specific cue among generic players or vice versa:
types action = "entity * cue * entity"
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Another datatype formalises security senses, while a stance can be introduced
by an intuitive notation:
datatype sense = caution | puzzlement | confidence | unconfidence
types stance = "sense set"
We also decide to formalise episodes as the cartesian product of actions and
stances. An episode then is a pair consisting of an action and a stance:
types episode = "action * stance"
In order to explain our method, it is useful to introduce two example players,
that is to define two constants:
consts PP::entity
consts II::entity
Here is a specific example episode with a specific stance including two senses:
definition ep :: episode where
"ep == ((PP, Begins, II), {caution, confidence})"
It can now be demonstrated how to prove obvious lemmas about the constants:
lemma "fst ep = (PP, Begins, II)" by (simp add: ep_def)
lemma "snd ep = {caution, confidence}" by (simp add: ep_def)
lemma "snd ep = {confidence, caution}" by (auto simp add: ep_def)
The first lemma states what the first element of example episode ep is; its Isabelle
proof script consists of a single method (on the same line as the lemma statement)
which invokes the simplifier (via simp) with an appeal to the definition of the
episode, automatically stored as ep_def. The second lemma is homologous for
the second component. The third lemma is equivalent to the second one, but
also confirms that because stances are defined as sets, the security senses they
feature can be indicated in any order. It can be observed that this simple form
of reasoning based on set theory cannot be handled by the simplifier alone, but
necessitates some classical reasoning (via auto).
A socio-technical protocol is defined coherently with what was seen above
(§4) — each path in the ceremony in Figure 3 is of this type:
types protocol = "episode list"
Finally, the constant hci can be declared:
inductive set hci :: "protocol set"
This constant, which formalises the full layer III, is defined by structural induc-
tion on the length of a protocol. Its definition is omitted due to space limits.
5.2 Formal Verification of the Example Ceremony
This Section outlines the main guarantees we have proved about our model of
layer III of the example ceremony. It can be seen how existential or universal
quantifiers are used to strengthen the conclusions. Full proof scripts are omitted.
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A first relevant statement is a theorem stating that a persona always aborts
with a sense of unconfidence:
theorem P_aborts_unconfident:
" [[ ((P,Aborts,I), sigma) ∈ set stp; stp ∈ hci ]]
=⇒ unconfidence ∈ sigma"
More formally, theorem P_aborts_unconfident states that, given a generic pro-
tocol stp of the model, featuring an episode whose action sees a generic agent
abort with a generic provider, and whose stance is generic, then that stance can
be proved to feature unconfidence.
Another theorem states when the sense of unconfidence is in a stance:
theorem unconfident_P_when:
" [[ (alpha, sigma) ∈ set stp; unconfidence ∈ sigma; stp ∈ hci ]]
=⇒ ∃ P I. alpha = (P,Aborts,I) ∨
alpha = (P,Queries,I) ∨
alpha = (I,Compels,P)"
Precisely, theorem unconfident_P_when insists on a generic protocol featuring an
episode that is generic except for the fact that its stance includes unconfidence.
The theorem concludes that, for some specific persona P and provider I, the
action in the precondition could only be of three forms.
A subsidiary lemma is useful to prove subsequent theorems:
lemma I_Ca_Co_explains:
" [[ ((I, gamma, P), sigma) ∈ set stp; caution ∈ sigma; confidence ∈ sigma;
stp ∈ hci ]]
=⇒ gamma = Explains"
Lemmas often have their own significance. This says that whenever a generic
episode appears but its stance features caution with confidence, then the cue
that is involved must be Explains.
An important theorem states the circumstances for registration to take place:
theorem P_registers_confident_when:
" [[ ((P,Registers,I), {confidence}) ∈ set stp; stp ∈ hci ]]
=⇒ ∃ sigma. ((I,Explains,P), sigma) ∈ set stp ∧
caution ∈ sigma ∧ confidence ∈ sigma"
More formally, theorem P_registers_confident_when insists on a protocol fea-
turing a specific registration episode. It then concludes that a corresponding
explanation episode must occur on the same protocol. Further, it specifies the
stance of the latter episode, which must include caution with confidence.
A final theorem specifies the stance of a registration episode appearing in a
protocol where no corresponding explanation episode occurs:
theorem P_registers_without_confidence:
" [[ ((P,Registers,I), sigma) ∈ set stp;
∀ sigma’. ((I,Explains,P), sigma’) /∈ set stp; stp ∈ hci ]] =⇒
confidence /∈ sigma"
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Precisely, theorem P_registers_without_confidence assumes a protocol with a
registration episode featuring a stance sigma. Also, it assumes that no explana-
tion episode, for no possible stance sigma’, ever occurs on that protocol. Upon
these preconditions, it concludes that sigma cannot feature the confidence sense.
6 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is threefold: the definition of a detailed model for
security ceremonies that relates the technical and the social layers; a graphical
representation of the complicated layer that features user personas who interact
with human-computer interfaces; the formal analysis of this layer.
There are several benefits of using formal methods at the persona layer. By
creating a formal model linking human practices with mental and emotional
models that users have about security, it becomes easier to conceptualise of on-
line services that respond to particular personas and how this might take place.
For example, the modelling of when explanations are required or not required is
a valuable tool for the design of on-line services because it provides indicators as
to when service providers need and need not intervene with privacy information
in the on-line process. In consequence, certain aborts that were often invisible
to analysts from the technological, rather than human, perspective may become
visible. Aborts are an important aspect of any ceremony because they provide
valuable input as to engagement with a particular security or privacy technology.
Formal methods also provide insights that may help detect potential weak-
nesses in the social and practice theories relating to security and privacy prac-
tices. For example, potential ceremony paths that have not surfaced in the field
research but that are possible in the formal model can be clearly identified. This
can draw field research into considering why certain ceremony paths have not
emerged in the grounded research and theorise about why this is so, thus ma-
turing the social and practice theories by identifying the all-important outliers.
The formal reasoning also provides a valuable critique to the technology design,
pinpointing where the technology design is insufficient for particular personas or
where superfluous functionality is provided. Finally, formal analysis is powerful
because it is enmeshed in practice-led research. This means that as the fieldwork
findings refine, so too does the formal model. Therefore, both model and field-
work interoperate to refine both the ceremony descriptions and their analysis.
The next challenge ahead is to tackle the other layers of our full ceremony model.
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A A primer on the theorem prover Isabelle
Isabelle is a generic, interactive theorem prover [26]. Generic means that it can
reason in a variety of formal systems. This paper refers to Isabelle/HOL [25],
which supports the formal language higher-order logic, a typed formalism that
allows quantification over functions, predicates and sets, but has no temporal op-
erators. Interactive means that it is not entirely automatic and, rather, requires
a good amount of human intervention. But Isabelle also provides much automa-
tion. Its simplifier, which can be invoked by the proof method simp, combines
rewriting with arithmetic decision procedures. Its automatic provers can solve
most simple proof scenarios. For example, the proof method blast implements
a fast classical reasoner, and auto combines that with the simplifier.
Most proofs are conducted interactively. In a typical proof, the user directs
Isabelle to perform a certain induction and then to simplify the resulting proof
state, which may contains a number of subgoals. Each subgoal can be given to
an automatic prover or be reduced to other subgoals by the use of some lemma.
Failure to find a proof for a conjecture may simply mean that the user is not
skilled enough; otherwise, it may exhibit what in the modelled system contradicts
the conjecture and hence help in locating a system bug or an erroneous human
intuition. The series of commands used to prove a theorem can be seen as a
proof sketch. confidence that the proof is sound comes from inspecting the line
of reasoning adopted and the lemmas it requires.
The typical Isabelle proof methods mentioned above, simp for the conditional
term rewriter and blast for the classical reasoner, are combined by the proof
method force, which only applies to the first subgoal in the proof state, and by
auto, which applies to the entire state. All these commands allow the installation
of additional lemmas to appeal to. A very useful method is clarify, performing
obvious steps, while clarsimp interleaves it with the simplifier. A variant of
clarify is safe, which additionally performs the obvious steps that split up the
subgoal.
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